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ABSTRACT
More than ten percent of Americans with recent work experience say they will continue social distancing
after the COVID-19 pandemic ends, and another 45 percent will do so in limited ways. We uncover this
Long Social Distancing phenomenon in our monthly Survey of Working Arrangements and Attitudes. It
is more common among older persons, women, the less educated, those who earn less, and in occupations
and industries that require many face-to-face encounters. People who intend to continue social distancing
have lower labor force participation—unconditionally, and conditional on demographics and other
controls. Regression models that relate outcomes to intentions imply that Long Social Distancing reduced
participation by 2.5 percentage points in the first half of 2022. Separate self-assessed causal effects imply
a reduction of 2.0 percentage points. The impact on the earnings-weighted participation rate is smaller at
about 1.4 percentage points. This drag on participation reduces potential output by nearly one percent and
shrinks the college wage premium. Economic reasoning and evidence suggest that Long Social
Distancing and its effects will persist for many months or years.

JEL Classification Codes: E24, J21, J22, J14, D12
Key Words: Social distancing, infection worries, pandemic, labor force participation, potential output,
college wage premium, self-assessed causal effects

Acknowledgments: We thank the Templeton World Charity Foundation, Smith Richardson Foundation,
Stanford University, Chicago Booth School of Business, Asociación Mexicana de Cultura A.C., Stanford Institute
for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, Toulouse Network for
Information Technology and the MIT Mobility Initiative for funding to conduct the Survey of Working
Arrangements and Attitudes. Katharine Abraham, Marianne Bertrand, Mark Bils, Robert Hall, Lisa Kahn, and
seminar and conference participants at ITAM, the U.S. Congressional Budget Office Panel of Economic Advisers,
and the NBER Conference on Wage Dynamics in the 21st Century provided many helpful comments on earlier
drafts. A special thanks to Abraham and Bertrand, discussants at the CBO and NBER events, respectively.
Upjohn Institute working papers are meant to stimulate discussion and criticism among the
policy research community. Content and opinions are the sole responsibility of the author.

1. Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic brought more awareness and a greater salience of the infection
risks that come with face-to-face encounters in public places, including the workplace. This shift
in perceptions and its influence on labor supply emerge clearly in data from our Survey of Working
Arrangements and Attitudes (SWAA). Since May 2020, we have fielded the SWAA each month
to thousands of working-age Americans with prior-year earnings of $10,000 or more. The survey
yields individual-level data on demographics, labor force status, working arrangements, concerns
about infection risks, social distancing intentions, and more. We use SWAA data from February
to July 2022, first, to characterize social distancing intentions and, second, to estimate their effects
on labor force participation, potential output, and the college wage premium.
More than ten percent of SWAA respondents say they will not return to pre-COVID
activities after the pandemic ends. Instead, they plan to avoid subways, crowded elevators, taxis,
ride-hailing services, and dining at indoor restaurants. Another 45% say they will continue limited
forms of social distancing. We refer to this phenomenon as “Long Social Distancing.” It is more
common among older persons, women, the less educated, and those who earn less. The strong
form of Long Social Distancing is especially prevalent among those who did not attend college,
exceeding 17 percent for this group. Strong-form Long Social Distancing rises with age, roughly
doubling from the early 20s to the early 60s. It is higher for women than men at all ages. It is about
three percentage points higher for Democrats than for Republicans and higher yet for those who
identify as Independents or with smaller political parties. Along several dimensions – education,
earnings, industry, and occupation – strong-form Long Social Distancing is more common when
remote work opportunities are fewer.
Despite meeting our prior earnings requirement, many SWAA participants are not in the
labor force during the survey reference week. When asked why, nine percent say that “worries
about catching COVID or other infectious disease” are the main reason. Another thirteen percent
cite infection concerns as a secondary reason. These concerns correlate with social distancing
intentions. For example, among persons who say infection worries are the main reason they are
out of the labor force, only 16 percent plan a full return to pre-COVID activities after the pandemic
ends. Among non-participants who do not cite infection worries, 38 percent plan a full return.
Among employed persons, 44 percent plan a full return.
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We estimate the effects of Long Social Distancing on labor force participation using two
distinct approaches. One approach uses self-assessed causal effects to calculate how much
infection worries depress participation. Our baseline calculation attributes non-participation fully
to infection worries for persons who cite them as the main reason for not working or seeking work.
It attributes 50 percent of non-participation to infection worries for persons who cite them as a
secondary reason. Aggregating over persons, this calculation implies an estimated drag on the
labor force participation rate of 2.0 percentage points, 1.4 points on an earnings-weighted basis.1
This approach to causal effects relies neither on assumption-heavy structural models nor assertions
about exogenous variation in the data. Instead, the identifying assumption is that respondents
accurately report the reasons for their own behaviors.
Economists seldom rely on self-reported explanations for own behaviors and outcomes to
assess causal effects.2 We think the self-assessment approach belongs in the tool kit of economists,
because standard approaches to ascertaining causal effects involve their own challenges,
limitations, and costs. Under the self-assessment approach, the identification challenge centers on
how to use surveys to elicit accurate explanations for own behaviors. Obviously, but importantly,
that is quite unlike the challenge of finding and using exogenous variation in quasi-experimental
settings or the challenge of creating suitable random variation in field experiments. As in
experimental and quasi-experimental studies, it is often useful to combine estimated causal effects
at the individual level with an equilibrium model to obtain aggregate effects. To that end, we
combine our participation findings with simple equilibrium models to estimate the impact of Long
Social Distancing on (potential) output and the college wage premium.
Our second approach is more conventional. We estimate regression models that explain
current labor force outcomes as a function of social distancing intentions and use the models to
draw inferences about causal effects on participation. We start with a simple specification that
treats all demographic groups as equally responsive to social distancing intentions. The model
yields large negative effects of social distancing intentions on current labor force participation.
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We also consider a range of other attribution values. Our most conservative attribution values (90% if
infection worries are the “main concern” and 10% if a “secondary concern”) implies an estimated drag on
the labor force participation rate of 1.3 percentage points.
2
For another example of the self-assessment approach to the estimation of causal effects, see the analysis
in Barrero et al. (2021a) of how better internet access would affect U.S. labor productivity and output. For
a broader discussion of the approach, see Stancheva (2022).
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The estimated effects are highly statistically significant, and their magnitude increases
monotonically with the strength of individual-level social distancing intentions. Controls for age,
sex, education and survey wave improve goodness-of-fit but matter very little for the modelimplied impact of social distancing intentions on labor force participation.
While the simple specification offers a transparent starting point, the equal-responsiveness
assumption is overly restrictive. It is now well established that better educated persons are much
more likely to hold jobs that are amenable to remote work, and much less likely to hold jobs that
require many face-to-face interactions with customers and coworkers.3 Thus, it is much easier for
the highly educated to practice full or limited social distancing while remaining employed. In
addition, because of their higher earnings, well-educated persons can more readily avoid
commuting modes that involve a high volume of close encounters with others. When we let the
effects of social distancing intentions vary by education in our regression models, we find the
largest effects by far for persons who did not attend college, moderate effects for persons with
some college, and small, often insignificant effects for those who completed college.
If social distancing intentions are exogenous with respect to individual-level labor force
status, conditional on controls, our fitted regressions yield causal effects of those intentions.
Accordingly, we use our regression models to quantify outcomes in a counterfactual scenario
where each person fully returns to pre-COVID activities. That is, we turn off any reported
intentions to continue social distancing and calculate model-implied outcomes. Relative to this
counterfactual, social distancing intentions reduce the participation rate by 2.5 percentage points
(1.4 points on an earnings-weighted basis). Our two approaches also yield similar labor force drag
effects at the level of groups defined by education, age, sex, earnings, and major industry sector.
We see this similarity of group-level effects as evidence for the internal validity of our estimates,
given that our two approaches use different data, rest on different identifying assumptions, and
rely on different methods.
To obtain the implied impact of Long Social Distancing on potential output, we adopt an
efficiency-units formulation of labor supply and posit a standard aggregate production function
with a labor input elasticity of two-thirds. Plugging the estimated earnings-weighted drag on
participation into the production function, we find that Long Social Distancing reduces potential
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See, for example, Adams-Prassl et al. (2020), Bartik et al. (2020), Barrero et al. (2021b), Dingel and
Neiman (2020), and Mongey, Pilossoph and Weinberg (2021).
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output by nearly one percent in the first half of 2022. This effect translates to an annual GDP loss
of about $250 billion at current prices.
Our findings on Long Social Distancing and its effects are broadly consistent with other
evidence of a lower willingness to work after COVID-19, especially among persons with less
education and lower market wages. Using data from the Survey of Consumer Expectations and the
Current Population Survey (CPS), Faberman, Mueller and Şahin (2022) find that fears of catching
COVID contribute to a reduced willingness to work in 2020 and 2021, and that such fears play a
larger role for women, older persons, and those with less education. Using employment and job
vacancy data, Forsythe et al. (2022) infer that the pandemic reduced the appeal of service jobs with
little scope for social distancing. Using CPS data, Autor and Dube (2022) document a remarkable
compression in the wage distribution from January-March 2020 to January-March 2022. Our
results say that Long Social Distancing reduced the relative supply of non-college workers by 1.4
to 3.6 percentage points in the first half of 2022. Combining this relative supply shift with a
standard labor demand framework, Long Social Distancing shrank the college wage premium by
an estimated 1.0 to 2.6 percentage points.
Our study also relates to a literature on how personal experience and exposure to major
shocks shape individual beliefs and economic decisions. Malmiender and Nagel (2011), for
example, develop evidence that past exposure to bad stock market outcomes depresses stock
market participation and shrinks the equity portfolio shares of those who do participate.
Malmendier and Wachter (2022) review the broader literature. In this regard, we note that
confirmed COVID-19 cases number nearly 100 million in the United States as of September 2022,
and deaths attributed to COVID exceed one million. Millions more lost immediate family members
or close friends to the disease. In addition, public health authorities mounted an extensive,
sustained campaign to persuade Americans to get vaccinated against the SARS-COV-2 virus, wear
masks, and engage in social distancing behaviors. In this light, it seems likely that the pandemic
experience led to heightened concerns about infection risks that, in turn, reduced labor force
participation. Our evidence strongly supports this view.
Other research considers the labor supply effects of “Long COVID,” which is shorthand
for the fatigue, cognitive dysfunction and other debilitating health conditions that some people
experience long after the end of an active COVID infection. According to the Household Pulse
Survey (HPS), 14.8 percent of American adults have experienced Long COVID symptoms as of
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July 2022.4 Bach (2022) draws on data from the June 2022 HPS and other sources to estimate that
Long COVID currently depresses the U.S. labor force by two to four million persons, or about 0.8
to 1.5 percentage points. Using different methods and sources, Cutler (2022) estimates that Long
COVID reduces the U.S. labor force by 3.5 million persons. Using yet different methods, Goda
and Soltas (2022) estimate that COVID-19 reduced participation by 0.2 percentage points.5 It
seems likely that Long COVID and Long Social Distancing are overlapping phenomena, but
existing data do not let us confidently disentangle their separate and overlapping effects. We are
currently fielding SWAA questions designed to do so.
The next section provides additional background and motivation for our study. Section 3
describes the Survey of Working Arrangements and Attitudes, and Section 4 uses SWAA data to
characterize the Long Social Distancing phenomenon. Section 5 estimates the effects of infection
worries and social distancing intentions on labor force participation. Section 6 quantifies the
implications for aggregate output and the college wage premium. It also argues that Long Social
Distancing and its effects are likely to persist for many months or years. Section 7 concludes.
2. The COVID-19 Experience, Risk Perceptions, and Behaviors
The SARS-COV-2 pandemic has killed more than a million Americans as of September 2022.
Hospital admissions to treat COVID-19 number about six million in the United States, and
confirmed COVID cases number nearly one hundred million.6 Americans with a family member
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https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/covid19/pulse/long-covid.htm#technical_notes, accessed 28 August 2022.
Goda and Soltas (2022) focus on employed persons who are absent from work throughout the survey
reference week mainly for health-related reasons. They then consider their labor force status one year
later. Several aspects of this empirical design help explain why they find much smaller effects than Bach
(2022) and Cutler (2022). First, Goda and Soltas exclude any effects on persons who, when ill, were not
employed. Second, they do not capture full-week work absences that occur outside the survey reference
week. When they adjust for these omissions, the estimated participation effects rise by half. Third, they
miss work absences that span only part of the survey reference week – for example, one that ends on the
fourth workday of the reference week and begins on Wednesday in the prior week. Fourth, persons who
work from home even a few hours in the reference while sick with COVID do not meet their week-long
work absence condition. Even if these persons experience persistent symptoms that reduce later
participation, they are not captured in the estimated effects. Finally, they “exclude workers who ever
report having a physical disability as well as those who, before their absence, ever report that they did not
participate in the labor force or worked fewer hours due to illness or disability.” Thus, they effectively
exclude many persons with pre-existing health conditions that make them especially vulnerable to
COVID and its health effects.
6
The figures for COVID deaths and confirmed cases are from the Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource
Center at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/region/united-states, accessed 28 September 2022. We obtain data
on hospitalizations from Our World in Data at https://ourworldindata.org/covid-hospitalizations, accessed
5
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or close friend who died from COVID-19 or required hospitalization to treat the disease probably
number in the tens of millions. All of this happened in just two and one-half years. In light of these
facts, we think personal and vicarious experiences with COVID-19 made infection risks more
salient, encouraged social distancing behaviors, and affected labor force participation.
Previous research supports this view. As an example, Dryhurst et al. (2020) investigate
COVID-related risk perceptions in a survey of nearly 7,000 persons across ten countries from midMarch to mid-April 2020. Their “COVID-19 risk perception index” captures the respondent’s
perceived risk of contracting COVID in the next six months, the perceived seriousness of the
illness, and their virus-related worries with regard to friends, family, and others. Looking across
persons, their index rises with both (a) personal experience with COVID-19 and (b) hearing about
the disease from family and friends, conditional on personal knowledge of the government’s
strategy for dealing with the pandemic, confidence in the understanding of scientists, trust in
government, trust in medical professionals, perceived efficacy of actions taken to mitigate COVID
risks, and other factors. As Dryhurst et al. stress (page 1001), “experience with the virus stands
out across all countries, such that people who have had personal and direct experience perceive
significantly higher risk.” They also find that “preventative health behaviors” (e.g., social
distancing, mask wearing) increase with their risk perceptions index. Among the two-thirds of
their sample that worked before the pandemic, 18 percent no longer worked four-to-six months
after hospital discharge, and 19 percent had made a health-related occupational change.
Schneider et al. (2021) study the relationship of health-protective behaviors to COVID-19 risk
perceptions in a series of cross-sectional surveys in the United Kingdom from March 2020 to
January 2021. Looking across persons, the adoption of mask wearing and social distancing
behaviors rises with risk perceptions, and the relationship becomes stronger in later survey waves.
As in Dryhurst et al., risk perceptions rise with personal experience with COVID, conditional on
a large set of other factors. Finally, Schneider et al. find that “psychological factors are more
predictive of risk perception than an objective measure of situational severity, i.e. the number of
confirmed COVID-19 cases at the time of data collection.” Many other studies also find that (most)
individuals undertake more self-protective behaviors when they perceive greater health-related

on 28 September 2022. Specifically, we sum the daily data on new hospitalizations in the previous seven
days to treat active COVID infections from 21 July 2020 to 26 September 2022, which yields a figure of
5.5 million.

6

risks. Examples include Brewer et al. (2004, Lyme disease), Brewer et al. (2007, meta study of
vaccine take up), Weinstein et al. (2007, influenza), Sadiecki et al. (2007, influenza), Bruine de
Bruin and Bennett (2020, COVID), and Wise et al. (2020, COVID).
In addition, there is now abundant evidence that many people experience impaired health for
weeks, months or longer after the end of an acute COVID illness. Lingering symptoms include
fatigue, dyspnea, pain, insomnia, headaches, loss of taste or smell, organ damage, memory
impairment, and reduced cognitive function. One well-cited study of 1,077 persons in the United
Kingdom who were hospitalized for COVID-19 and discharged in 2020 finds that only 29 percent
felt “fully recovered” four-to-six months after discharge (Evans et al., 2021, page 11). In a meta
study of the broader literature, Groff et al. (2021) find that more than half of COVID-19 survivors
experienced symptoms six months after recovery. The most common symptoms “involved
functional mobility impairments, pulmonary abnormalities, and mental health disorders.” People
who live with post-infection symptoms receive daily, sometimes constant, reminders that their
health is adversely affected by a previous bout with COVID. These reminders keep COVID-related
risks top of mind, and they may increase the salience of other infection risks as well.
There is also evidence that perceived own risks of developing a life-threatening health
condition are greater when family members have had the condition. For example, persons with a
family history of lung cancer perceive a two- or three-fold greater risk of developing the disease
than others (Chen and Kaphingst, 2011). Women with a family history of breast cancer perceive a
higher personal risk of breast cancer and are more likely to screen for the condition (Katapodi et
al., 2009). Experimental studies find that exposure to (information about) one type of risk, when
it generates a strong emotional response, raises the perceived likelihood of other, unrelated risks.
See, for example, Johnson and Tversky (1983) and Lee et al. (2010).
Since early in the pandemic, public health authorities have undertaken extensive, sustained
campaigns to inform the population about COVID-related risks and to encourage (and often
mandate) social distancing and other protective behaviors. 7 It would be surprising if these
extraordinary communication and persuasion efforts did not leave a lasting imprint on COVIDrelated risk perceptions and on the behavioral responses of at least some people. Indeed, previous
See, for example, the “COVID-19 Public Education Campaign,” which the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services describes as a “national initiative to increase public confidence in and uptake of
COVID-19 vaccines while reinforcing basic prevention measures such as mask wearing and social
distancing.” https://wecandothis.hhs.gov/about, accessed 28 August 2022.
7

7

research finds that strong fear appeals by public health authorities yield high levels of perceived
risk in the population, more health-protective behaviors, and greater expressed intentions to engage
in such behaviors. See the meta study by Witte and Allen (2020) and the review of experimental
studies in Sheeran, Harris and Epton (2014). Athey et al. (2022) conduct a large-scale evaluation
of public information campaigns and find that they influenced self-reported beliefs.
Media sources amplified the messaging efforts of public health authorities. Sacerdote, Seghal
and Cook (2020) show that coverage of COVID-related developments in the top 15 U.S. media
sources (by readership and viewership) was overwhelmingly negative in the first months of 2020,
and much more negative than the scientific literature and major media sources outside the United
States. They also find that major U.S. media devote more attention to the positive effects of mask
wearing and social distancing than major non-U.S. media. Ash et al. (2020), Bursztyn et al. (2020)
Simonov et al. (2020) all find that the tone of media coverage affects the propensity to engage in
social distancing behaviors.
To sum up, the frequency of direct personal experiences with COVID-19, the frequency of
COVID-related deaths and hospitalizations among family and friends, the high incidence of
persistent symptoms among those who recover from COVID, the extraordinary campaign by
public health officials to highlight COVID risks and underscore the need for preventative health
measures, and media amplification of official messaging all operated to raise the perceived risk of
COVID and to encourage social distancing behaviors. These developments motivate the
hypothesis that new and intensified concerns about infection risks since the onset of the pandemic
have reduced labor force participation. We investigate this hypothesis in Section 5.
There is some prior evidence that exposure to one type of risk can raise the perceived likelihood
of other risks, but the existing literature appears to be thin in this regard. We are unaware of
research that investigates the extent to which personal and vicarious experiences with one type of
negative health shock affect the salience or perceived likelihood of other health risks. In particular,
we know of no research that assesses whether negative COVID-19 experiences raise the perceived
likelihood of influenza, pneumonia or other infectious diseases. There also appears to be little
research on the persistence of risk perception reactions and behavioral responses to experiences
with infectious diseases and to public health campaigns and media messaging about infection risks
and preventative behaviors. Section 6 provides evidence that social distancing and labor force
participation responses are quite persistent for a small but nontrivial share of the population.
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3. The Survey of Working Arrangements and Attitudes (SWAA)
We have fielded a Survey of Working Arrangements and Attitudes (SWAA) of our own
design since May 2020. Each month, we sample thousands of U.S. residents, 20 to 64 years of age,
who meet a prior earnings requirement. 8 We ask about demographics, labor force status, industry
and occupation of current or most recent job, working from home, attitudes towards remote work,
social distancing intentions, and more. From May 2020 to March 2021, sample inclusion requires
earnings of at least $20,000 in 2019. From April to September 2021, we transitioned to a lower
earnings threshold of $10,000 in 2019. From January to March 2022, we transitioned to a threshold
of $10,000 in 2021, which applies to most of the data we use in this study.
To implement the SWAA, we contract with market research firms like IncQuery. The
market research firm provides a platform to program the survey questions and intermediates with
other firms (e.g., Lucid) that offer access to pre-recruited panels of prospective survey participants.
When a survey wave goes to field, the market research firm issues email invitations to prospective
respondents and continues until reaching the desired number and mix of participants. Email
recipients are selected based on their location within the United States and their (imperfectly
known) demographic characteristics. The email message states the estimated survey completion
time, but does not describe the topic, and includes a link to an online questionnaire. Respondents
who complete the survey receive cash, vouchers or award points, which they can donate. We do
not contact respondents ourselves, do not collect personally identifiable information, and have no
way to re-contact them. See Aksoy et al. (2022) for a fuller discussion of this survey technology
and evidence of its widespread use in commercial applications.
Before proceeding to our empirical analysis, we drop “speeders” with survey completion
times so short as to suggest a lack of careful attention to questions and response options. After
dropping speeders (about 16 percent of the sample), median survey completion times range from
7 to 12 minutes across waves, which vary in number and complexity of questions. We then
reweight the SWAA data to match CPS employment shares in cells defined by the cross product
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We adopted this requirement to cost-effectively sample persons with recent working experience. As our
funding grew, we relaxed and then eliminated this requirement over the course of several months in 2022.
The next draft will also consider the impact of infection worries and social distancing intentions on the
current labor force participation of persons who do not meet a prior-earnings requirement.
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of age, sex, education, and earnings categories.9 The aim is to construct a sample that is
representative of our target population.
Much of this paper focuses on a sample of 27,632 responses collected in six waves from
February to July 2022 (inclusive). These waves cover all questions needed to estimate the impact
of Long Social Distancing on labor force participation, using either regression models or selfassessed causal effects. We also use SWAA data back to July 2020 for some of our robustness
checks and extensions.
Our core analysis samples drop respondents who fail any of the three attention check
questions shown in appendix Figures A.1, A.2, and A.3. These questions aim to identify
respondents who fail to read questions carefully. For “What color is grass?... Make sure that you
select purple…” we keep respondents who choose purple or green. For “In how many cities with
more than 500,000 inhabitants have you lived?... Irrespective of your answer please insert the
number 33,” we drop respondents who do not report 33. For “What is 3 + 4?” we drop respondents
who give any response other than 7. An additional 12% of respondents (after dropping speeders)
fail one or more attention check questions. 10
Despite our best efforts to construct a representative sample for the target SWAA
population, non-random selection on unobservables could still bias our estimates of labor supply
responsiveness to infection worries and social distancing intentions. To assess this concern, we
fielded an HPS question about the “main reason for not working for pay or profit” in the August
2022 SWAA. We then compare HPS and SWAA responses to the HPS question. Because the HPS
does not ask about earnings, we use household income data to create an HPS sample that crudely
approximates the individual earnings requirement that defines our target SWAA population.

9

To avoid large monthly changes in the weight on any given cell, we use a rolling-weights scheme since
April 2021. In month t, we compute the share of observations in each age-sex-education-earnings cell
during the six months covering t-5 to t. We construct the weights for month t by up- or down-weighting
those proportions so as to match the CPS share of the population in each cell. We construct the weights for
May 2020 to March 2021 by pooling across all months during that period, so the weights are identical for
the same cell across months during that period.
10
We first included attention-check questions in late 2021 and did not include “What is 3 + 4?” till
March 2022. Thus, we cannot make use of these questions in the parts of our empirical analysis that
extend back to 2020. Fortunately, our main results are not very sensitive to the exclusion of persons who
fail attention-check questions in the more recent data.
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As reported in Table 1, 1.5 percent of the resulting HPS sample gave “I was concerned
about getting or spreading the coronavirus” as the reason for not working. 2.1 percent of the SWAA
sample gave this reason. The difference is statistically insignificant but consistent with a modest
tilt in the SWAA sample towards persons who don’t work because of COVID-19 concerns.
However, another 2.4 percent of the HPS sample gave their reason for not working as “I was sick
with coronavirus symptoms or caring for someone who was sick with coronavirus symptoms.”
Only 1.3 percent of the SWAA sample gave this reason. Someone who is sick with the coronavirus,
or caring for someone who is, could reasonably select either response option shown in Table 1.
Doing the arithmetic, 3.9 percent of the HPS sample gave one of the two responses related to
coronavirus fears, as compared to 3.4 percent of the SWAA sample. This comparison gives no
indication that the SWAA sample suffers from a form of selection that would overstate the impact
of infection worries on labor force participation. Thus, we see these comparisons as broadly
reassuring about the representativeness of the SWAA sample along the key dimension that matters
for our study. That said, we recognize that this analysis does not prove the absence of selection
bias, given the imperfect nature of our HPS-SWAA sample comparisons, the ambiguity of the HPS
response options, and the possibility that the HPS itself suffers from selection problems.
For more information about the SWAA, we refer interested readers to Barrero, Bloom, and
Davis (2021b) and www.WFHresearch.com/. The monthly SWAA survey instruments are
available at www.WFHresearch.com/survey-design-and-question-repository/, and the SWAA
micro data are accessible to interested researchers at https://wfhresearch.com/data. For description
and analysis of data from a closely related many-country survey, see Aksoy et al. (2022).
4. The Long Social Distancing Phenomenon
We quantify and characterize social distancing intentions using versions of a SWAA
question first fielded in July 2020. The version in effect since June 2022 reads as follows:
As the COVID-19 pandemic ends, which of the following would best fit your views on
social distancing?
- Complete return to pre-COVID activities
- Substantial return to pre-COVID activities, but I would still be wary of things like
riding the subway or getting into a crowded elevator
- Partial return to pre-COVID activities, but I would be wary of many activities like
eating out or using Uber, Lyft, or other ride hailing services
- No return to pre-COVID activities, as I will continue to social distance
Over time, we modified the initial clause in this question to keep the focus on a post-pandemic
future. From October 2021 to May 2022, the question began with “Once the COVID-19 pandemic
11

has ended…” and continued with a nearly identical set of response options, as shown in Appendix
Figure A.4.11 From March to September 2021, we began with “Once most of the population has
been vaccinated against COVID …”, because the prevailing view then held that sufficiently high
vaccination rates would produce herd immunity and halt the pandemic. In January and February
2021, the question began “If a COVID vaccine becomes widely available …”, and in December
2020 it began “If a COVID vaccine is approved and made widely available …” Earlier waves
began “If a COVID vaccine is discovered and made widely available …”
Figure 1 shows the distribution of responses to this question from February to July 2022.
13% of respondents intend “No return to pre-COVID activities, as I will continue to social
distance.” 46% intend either a “Substantial” or “Partial” return. Only 42% say they plan a
“Complete return.” We refer to intentions to continue at least some forms of social distancing after
the pandemic as “Long Social Distancing.” It is reasonable to hypothesize that such intentions
subside over time with the discovery and roll-out of SAR-COV-2 vaccines, the spread of (partial)
immunity due to recovery from COVID, and better treatments for the disease. In fact, rates of
hospitalization and deaths attributed to COVID fell markedly but unevenly over time. These
developments could lessen fears related to COVID, and perhaps other infectious diseases as well,
and lead to a fall in social distancing intentions.
Figure 2 considers this hypothesis by plotting from July 2020 to July 2022 the percent of
SWAA respondents who (a) plan a complete return to their pre-COVID activities after the
pandemic and (b) intend to continue strong-form social distancing. Those planning a complete
return rise from about 25% in July 2020 to more than 40% in all but one month of 2022 thus far.
The share temporarily dips in the Winter of 2020-2021 and late Summer of 2021, when the United
States saw large surges in COVID infections. In contrast, the share that intends “no return to preCOVID activities” has stabilized at roughly 12 percent since summer 2021. In the descriptive
analysis to follow, we focus on this strong form of Long Social Distancing. Our analysis in
Sections 5 and 6 uses the full range of expressed social distancing intentions.
The strong form of Long Social Distancing falls sharply with education and earnings
(Figure 3), rises with age (Figure 4), and is higher for women than men at all ages (Figure 5).
These patterns make sense. People with less education and lower earnings have a higher incidence
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In June 2022, we randomized over the older and newer versions of the question.
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of pre-existing health conditions that place them at greater risk of death or serious illness from
COVID and other infectious diseases. They also tend to hold jobs that place them at greater risk
of infection (e.g., Mongey, Pilossoph and Weinberg, 2021). Older people are also at greater risk
from COVID-19, a pattern that became evident and widely reported early in the course of the
pandemic. Compared to men, women are more likely to be primary care givers for children (some
of whom are too young for vaccination) and the elderly (who are highly vulnerable to COVID and
other infectious diseases). Their greater care-giving responsibilities may lead women to practice
more social distancing as part of precautionary efforts to protect those in their care.
The incidence of Long Social Distancing also varies with partisan affiliation. Aggregating
over the sub-groups reported in Figure 6, only 9.7 percent of Republicans intend to practice strong
forms of social distancing after the pandemic as compared to 12.4 percent of Democrats, 14.9
percent of Independents, and 21.0 percent of those who identify with a small party or don’t
know/prefer not to say their partisan affiliation. This pattern is consistent with other evidence on
the relationship of partisan affiliation and political leanings to perceptions about COVID risks and
social distancing behaviors. For example, Allcott et al. (2020) find that Republicans were less
likely to engage in social distancing behaviors during the pandemic. They also provide suggestive
evidence that partisan differences in news consumption sources partly account for differences in
COVID-related risk perceptions and social distancing behaviors. Likewise, Pennycook et al.
(2021) find that COVID-related risk perceptions and risk-avoidance behaviors during the
pandemic correlate with political leanings.
The appendix documents several other cross-sectional patterns. Strong-form social
distancing intentions are more common among people who work (or most recently worked) in
industries and occupations that present higher infection risks because the jobs are not amenable to
working from home, because they require a high volume of face-to-face encounters with others,
or both. See Figures A.6 and A.7, which report the incidence of strong-form Long Social
Distancing by industry sector and occupational category. For example, the rate of strong-form
Long Social Distancing is 14 percent in the Health Care & Social Assistance and Leisure &
Hospitality sectors but only 9 percent in Finance, Insurance & Real Estate and in the Information
sector. It is 16-18 percent in Transportation-related occupations and Other Personal Services but
only 9 percent in Office and Administrative Support functions and in Construction & Extraction
occupations. Desired work-from-home days rise with the strength of social distancing intentions
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(Figure A.8). Finally, Table A.1 reports the joint distribution of social distancing intentions and
the self-assessed role of infection fears as a reason for not working or seeking work. Stronger
social distancing intentions go hand-in-hand with a larger role for infection worries in deterring
labor force participation. Consider strong-form social distancing intentions relative to the
incidence of a complete return to pre-COVID activities. This ratio is 3.5 times higher among
persons who cite infection worries as the “main reason” for not working or seeking work compared
to those who say it is not a factor. The ratio is 2.6 times higher among persons who cite infection
worries as a secondary reason for non-participation.
In summary, the SWAA data reveal several noteworthy patterns in social distancing
intentions. First, most respondents say they intend to continue at least some forms of social
distancing after the pandemic ends. Second, the rate of strong-form social distancing intentions
rises with age and falls sharply with education and earnings. It is also higher for women than men
at all ages. Third, strong-form incidence is greater among people who work in industries and
occupations that offer less scope for remote work and require more face-to-face encounters.
Fourth, among respondents outside the labor force in the survey reference week, social distancing
intentions are stronger for those who attribute a larger role to infection worries for their labor force
status. These cross-sectional patterns indicate that expressions of social distancing intentions are
more than cheap talk. In particular, persons who face higher infection risks by virtue of their jobs,
and those who face greater mortality and health risks if they contract COVID (or influenza or many
other infectious diseases), express stronger social distancing intentions.
5. The Impact of Long Social Distancing on Labor Force Participation
We have established that most adult Americans with prior work experience express
intentions to continue at least limited forms of social distancing after the pandemic, and that more
than one-tenth intend to continue a strong form of social distancing. We turn now to an
investigation of how these intentions and infection worries affect labor force participation.
A. Infection worries deter labor force participation
Since February 2022, we have put the following question to SWAA respondents who are
outside the labor force (i.e., not working and not seeking work) in the survey reference week:
Are worries about catching COVID or other infectious diseases a factor in your decision
not to seek work at this time?
- Yes, the main reason
- Yes, a secondary reason
14

-

No

We randomize the ordering of the two “Yes” options, so that half see “main reason” first and the
other half see “secondary reason” first.
This question elicits the respondent’s own assessment of whether infection worries are a
causal factor in their decision not to seek work. As shown in Figure 7, 9.3 percent of respondents
cite infection worries as the main reason for not seeking work, and another 12.5 percent cite such
worries as a secondary reason. These results provide direct evidence that infection worries deter
labor force participation in the period from February to July 2022.
We deliberately frame the question in terms of “catching COVID or other infectious
diseases” to allow for the possibility that the pandemic experience increased the salience of all
work-related infection risks, not just COVID-related ones. In fact, when we compare responses
across this question and the earlier HPS question, we find strong evidence that COVID-related
infection risks are not the only infection worries that deter labor force participation as of August
2022. Table 2 reports the comparison: 2.3 percent of respondents to the HPS question say their
concern “about getting or spreading the coronavirus” is “the main reason for not working for pay
or profit,” whereas 8.3 percent say that “worries about catching COVID or other infectious
diseases” are the “main reason” for not seeking work. This comparison says that a narrow framing
around COVID-related risks only understates the full impact of the pandemic experience on labor
force participation.
Perhaps Figure 7 overstates the role of infection worries as a deterrent to labor force
participation, because the underlying question places the two “Yes” options before the “No”
option. Here, and elsewhere, our SWAA data could be affected by primacy bias – a tendency of
respondents to pick answers that appear earlier in the list of response options. Our practice of
dropping speeders eliminates respondents who simply click on the first option, which reduces the
potential for primacy bias. In addition, our short survey instrument and omission of persons who
fail an attention-check question mitigates any tendency to pick early options that arises from
survey fatigue or inattentiveness. Nevertheless, these practices do not eliminate the potential for
primacy bias to affect our results.
In light of this concern, we are transitioning to a heavier reliance on randomized response
orderings in the SWAA. In the June and July waves, we randomized over two versions of the
preceding question: The “No” option appeared first half the time and last half the time. In both
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cases, we continue to randomize the order of the two “Yes” options. We find that 79.9 percent of
respondents choose “No” when it appears first, and 77.4 percent do so when it appears last. The
difference of 2.5 points is statistically insignificant, with a t-statistic of 0.8. The percentage who
select “Yes, secondary reason” is about one point higher when it appears first rather than last, with
a t-statistic of 0.3 for the difference. Finally, 9.9 percent select “Yes, main reason” when it appears
first as compared to 6.6 percent when it appears last. The t-statistic for this difference is 1.7, which
is statistically significant at the 10 percent level but not the 5 percent level. Thus, there is limited
evidence that the response ordering in the earlier SWAA waves leads us to overstate the impact of
infection worries on labor force participation. 12
B. Quantifying the causal effect of infection worries on labor force participation
Our first approach to estimating the impact of Long Social Distancing on participation
relies on the self-assessed causal effects of infection worries. Table 3 presents our baseline
calculation. Column (1) reports the response distribution to our question about infection worries
among persons outside the labor force, and column (2) reports the corresponding distribution in
the full sample. Column (3) reports the values we assign to “Yes, main reason” and “Yes,
secondary reason” in quantifying the causal effect of infection worries on participation. We
attribute non-participation fully to infection worries for those who cite infection worries as the
“main reason” and fifty percent for those who cite it as a secondary reason. We attribute no role to
infection worries to all others outside the labor force in the reference week and to those who are
working, unemployed or furloughed. 13
Column (4) describes the resulting calculation and bottom-line estimate. It says that
infection worries dragged down the labor force participation rate by 2.0 (0.1) percentage points in
the period from February to July 2022. Repeating the calculations on an earnings-weighted basis
yields an estimated labor force drag of 1.4 (0.1) points. Appendix Table A.2 considers other
attribution values in calculating the effects of infection worries. They yield estimated drags on
labor force participation of 1.3 to 2.3 percentage points. Our most conservative attribution values
(90 percent for “main concern” and 10% for “secondary concern”) yield an estimated drag on the
participation rate of 1.3 percentage points. Following up on our earlier discussion, we also assess
12

If present, primacy bias leads us to understate the strength of social distancing intentions, given the
ordering of responses to the SWAA question set forth at the outset of Section 3.
13
We treat persons who are employed and paid but not working in the reference week as in the labor
force.

16

the potential impact of primacy bias. Using data from the June and July 2022 waves, we estimate
a labor force drag of 1.9 (0.2) points when “No” appears last in the response ordering and 1.5 (0.1)
points when it appears first. The corresponding earnings-weighted estimates are 1.2 and 1.1 points,
respectively, with a standard error of 0.1 points in both cases.14 Thus, we find evidence of primacy
bias, but its impact is modest.
C. Regression Analysis of Social Distancing Intentions and Participation
Our second approach to estimating the impact of Long Social Distancing on participation
relies on regression-based quantifications of counterfactual scenarios. Table 4 reports a bare-bones
regression specification that relates participation to social distancing intentions and illustrates how
we quantify the implied effects. We regress 100 × 𝟏(Not working and not looking for work)𝑖𝑡
for person 𝑖 in month 𝑡 on his or her social distancing intentions. Column (1) reports the fitted
regression in SWAA data from February to July 2022. Relative to those who plan a “complete
return to pre-COVID activities,” persons who plan “No return” are 15.3 (1.1) percentage points
more likely to be out of the labor force, a huge effect. Those who plan a “partial return” are 4.1
(0.9) points more likely to be outside the labor force, and those who plan a “substantial return” are
0.4 (0.6) points more likely.
Next, we multiply the sample share in each category of social distancing intentions by the
corresponding regression coefficient to obtain the implied drag on participation relative to
“complete return.” Then we sum the resulting products in the rightmost column of Table 4 to
obtain a total effect on labor force participation of minus 2.6 percentage points. If the regression
is correctly specified and social distancing intentions are exogenous with respect to participation,
this procedure yields an estimate for the causal effect of Long Social Distancing on the
participation rate relative to a counterfactual scenario that turns off all social distancing intentions.
Table 5 fits regressions with successively larger sets of controls and repeats the same type
of calculations. In each specification, the key coefficients of interest increase monotonically with
the intensity of social distancing intentions. While the controls greatly improve the regression
goodness-of-fit, they have very little impact on the overall estimated effect of social distancing
intentions on the participation rate. The specification in column (5) – which controls for survey
wave, sex, age categories, and education categories – yields on overall estimated Long Social
14

As we discuss more fully in Section 6.C, the estimated effects of infection worries and social distancing
intentions on labor force participation have diminished somewhat in recent months.
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Distancing drag on the labor force of 2.5 (0.3) percentage points. The corresponding earningsweighted drag (not shown) is 1.5 percentage points.
If we add industry fixed effects to the specification in column (5), the estimated drag falls
to 1.8 percentage points. Thus, when looking across persons with current or recent work history in
the same industry, social distancing intentions have somewhat weaker negative effects on
participation. Even in this case, the estimated labor force drag is large in magnitude. We do not
think the inclusion of industry (or occupation) controls is appropriate for the purposes of estimating
causal effects of Long Social Distancing. For one thing, industry and occupation effects control
for job characteristics rather than individual characteristics or time effects. Someone with a
previous history of working in the Leisure & Hospitality sector, for example, might continue
working in the sector, find work in another sector, or exit the labor force. These choices are surely
correlated with social distancing intentions and will mechanically affect the industry classification
of those who switch sectors. The same point pertains to occupation controls. Thus, our preferred
specifications do not include industry and occupation controls.
As we discussed in the introduction, the equal-responsiveness assumption embedded into
the specifications in Tables 4 and 5 is overly restrictive. Table 6 relaxes this assumption by letting
the coefficients on social distancing intentions vary freely across education groups.15 As
anticipated, social distancing intentions have stronger effects on participation for persons with less
education. Recall from Section 3 that social distancing intentions are also stronger for the less
educated. Thus, we estimate a much larger drag on participation for the less educated: 4.8 (0.7)
points for persons who did not attend college, 2.4 (0.5) points for persons with 1-3 years of college,
0.6 (0.5) for those with a college degree, and 0.9 (0.6) points for those with a graduate degree. For
the two highest education groups, the estimated drag is positive but statistically insignificant. The
results in Table 6 imply an overall labor force drag of 2.5 percentage points on an equal-weighted
basis and 1.4 points on an earnings-weighted basis.
Among other things, the results in Table 6 imply that Long Social Distancing substantially
reduces the relative labor supply of the less educated, which raises economywide average labor
productivity through a composition effect. These results also throw light on why our estimates for
15

Column 2 pools across respondents with no high school degree and only high school degree, and the
education fixed effects allow for separate constants for these two groups. In columns 3 to 5, the education
category fixed effects collapse into a constant term, since those samples only include a single education
group at a time.
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the overall earnings-weighted drag on labor force participation are a good deal smaller than the
equal-weighted estimates. The earnings-weighted drag is a more useful summary statistic for
thinking about certain macroeconomic implications, e.g., the effects on potential output.
D. Labor force drag estimates at the group level: Comparing the two approaches
Appendix Tables A.3 and A.4 report, respectively, equal-weighted and earnings-weighted
estimates of the labor force drag under our two approaches. We let the effects of social distancing
intentions vary freely across groups under the regression approach in light of our discussion around
Table 6. Conceptually, the flexible specification is also closer to the non-parametric nature of our
self-assessment approach. The main new findings in Tables A.3 and A.4 can be anticipated from
our earlier analysis. Specifically, the estimated drag due to infection worries (self-assessment
approach) and social distancing intentions (regression approach) falls with earnings, rises with age,
is higher for women, and is higher in the service sector than the goods sector. Interestingly, we
also find that labor force participation decisions of Democrats are much more sensitive to infection
worries and social distancing intentions than is the case for Republicans and Independents.
Figure 8 summarizes the equal-weighted results (Table A.3) in the form of a scatter plot
that highlights the similarity of the group-level drag estimates across the two approaches. The
figure shows the estimated drag effect under the self-assessment approach on the horizontal scale
and under the regression approach on the vertical scale. The two sets of estimates display a strong,
nearly linear relationship, although the regression approach tends to yield larger drag estimates for
the groups that are most impacted by the Long Social Distancing phenomenon. We see Figure 8
as highly reassuring about our main inferences regarding the effects of Long Social Distancing on
labor force participation. In particular, the figure provides strong evidence for the internal validity
of our estimates, given that the two approaches use different data, rest on different identifying
assumptions, and rely on different methods.
In closing this section, we stress that our analysis is by no means a full treatment of the
forces affecting labor force participation in 2021 and 2022. Extremely tight labor markets in the
past year (as of September 2022) have helped boost participation. Unusually strong household
balance sheets have probably reduced participation. Disruptions in schooling and childcare
services in the early stages of the pandemic may have had persistent effects on participation. And
COVID-related care-giving may continue to reduce participation. These effects of these forces are
likely to differ by age, sex, and education.
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6. Implications and Prospects
A. Long Social Distancing reduces output
We now combine our labor force drag estimates with a simple equilibrium model to
quantify the implied effects on potential output. To do so, we adopt an efficiency-units formulation
of the aggregate labor input and posit a standard aggregate production function that exhibits
constant returns to scale and a labor input elasticity of two-thirds. In computing labor efficiency
units, we weight persons (and groups of persons) by earnings, which accounts for variation in
hours worked per employed person. Implicitly, this weighting method also assumes that people
are paid their marginal value products, at least on average. That assumption is surely an
approximation, but it is a useful one in this context.
Using this theoretical framework, we quantify the impact of Long Social Distancing on
potential output using our estimate of its overall impact on the earnings-weighted labor force
participation rate. The specific calculation for the percentage impact is
2

Potential Output Loss = 100 (3) ln(1 − Labor Force Drag).

(1)

Plugging in the earnings-weighted labor force drag estimate of 1.4 percent from both Table 3 and
Table 6 implies a loss in potential output of 0.94 percent. Thus, we conclude that Long Social
Distancing reduced potential output in the U.S. economy by about one percent in the first half of
2022 relative to a counterfactual with no participation-deterrent role for infection worries or social
distancing intentions.
U.S. labor markets have been extremely tight in 2022, at least through July. So, it is
reasonable to supplement our potential output calculation with a full-employment assumption.
With that extra assumption, this analysis also implies that Long Social Distancing reduced actual
U.S. output by about one percent in the first half of 2022. This is a material effect, corresponding
to an annual GDP flow of about $250 billion dollars at current prices.
B. Long Social Distancing shrinks the college wage premium
We now assess the impact of Long Social Distancing on the college wage premium. To do
so, we combine our labor force drag estimates by education group with a standard labor demand
model. In particular, we posit a CES technology defined over two labor types and treat relative
wages as the outcome of a competitive equilibrium. See Katz and Murphy (1992, Section VI) for
a well-known application of this framework to the evolution of the U.S. college wage premium.
They use the framework to quantify how much rising educational levels moderated the impact of
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increased demand for better-educated workers on the college wage premium. We use it to assess
how much Long Social Distancing reduced the college wage premium.
Let C and HS index college-equivalent and other workers, respectively. In this framework,
the college wage premium responds to a shift in the relative supply of college-equivalent workers
according to
𝑤𝐶
1
𝐿𝐶
∆ ln ( 𝐻𝑆 ) = − ( ) ∆ ln ( 𝐻𝑆 ),
𝑤
𝜎
𝐿

(2)

𝐿𝐶

where ∆ ln (𝐿𝐻𝑆 ) is the relative supply shift, 𝜎 is the elasticity of substitution between collegeequivalent and other workers in the production technology, and the equation gives the modelimplied change in the college wage premium. Katz and Murphy (1992) adopt 𝜎 = 1.41 as their
preferred estimate for the substitution elasticity. Other studies also conclude that a value in the
neighborhood of 1.5 is appropriate for the elasticity of substitution between college-educated and
other workers. See Ciccone and Peri (2005), for example.
To operationalize (2), we obtain supply shifts by education group from Table 6 and
𝐿𝐶

compute ∆ ln (𝐿𝐻𝑆 ) in a standard manner. Recall from Table 6 that Long Social Distancing reduced
the labor force participation of the HS group by an estimated 4.8 percentage points. For the collegeequivalent group, we average the estimated labor force drag effects over the “some college,” “4year college” “graduate degree” groups using their sample shares as weights. The average drag for
college-equivalent workers is -1.4 percentage points. Putting the pieces together and calculating
1

1−0.014

1

the right side of (2), we obtain − (1.41) ∆ ln (1−0.048) = − (1.41) (0.035) = −0.025. In words,
Long Social Distancing raises the relative supply of college-equivalent workers by 3.5 percentage
points, which shrinks the college wage premium by 2.5 percentage points.
If, instead, we use the self-assessment approach, and repeat the same calculations (drawing
on results reported in Table A.3), Long Social Distancing raises the relative supply of collegeequivalent workers by 1.3 percentage points, shrinking the college wage premium by 0.9
percentage points. The self-assessment approach yields a smaller effect on the college wage
premium mainly because it delivers a much smaller labor force drag estimate for non-college
workers, and, secondarily, because it yields a modestly larger drag for college-equivalent workers.
We close this discuss with two additional remarks: First, the foregoing wage-premium
estimates rely on a substitution elasticity value used to explain year-to-year and medium-run
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changes in the college wage premium. The COVID-19 pandemic was a surprise event that drove
an abrupt increase in the relative supply of college-educated workers. The possibilities for
substitution between more and less educated workers in the near-term aftermath of the pandemic
may be more limited than implied by a 1.41 elasticity value. If, for example, the near-term
substitution elasticity is only half as large as the 1.41 value, the implied effects on the college wage
premium are twice as big.
Second, our analysis here quantifies only one channel through which the pandemic affected
the wage structure. The pandemic also operated on the wage structure through other channels. For
example, it reduced the amenity value of low-pay jobs that require many face-to-face encounters
(jobs held disproportionately by less educated workers), and it raised the amenity value of jobs
that offer new-found opportunities for remote work (held disproportionately by highly educated
workers). See Barrero et al. (2022c) for a fuller discussion and evidence that wages have
responded to pandemic-induced changes in the amenity value of work. The point is that our
analysis here is not mean to capture the full impact of the pandemic on the college wage premium.
Instead, it quantifies the impact through one particular channel.
C. On the persistence of Long Social Distancing and its effects
The evidence and analysis above raise two questions: How long will Long Social
Distancing persist? How long will its effects persist? We cannot provide definitive answers to
these questions, but we can marshal evidence that supports an informed prognosis. We do so now.
A natural conjecture is that Long Social Distancing and its effects rise and fall with
pandemic severity. As it turns out, this conjecture finds little support in the data. Figure A.9 in the
appendix displays the seven-day moving average of daily COVID deaths and hospitalizations in
the United States through August 2022. These two indicators of pandemic severity show only a
weak time-series relationship to the strength of social distancing intentions in Figure 2. The share
of respondents who say they intend a “complete return to pre-COVID activities” falls somewhat
in late 2020/early 2021 and again in autumn 2021, two periods with local peaks in COVID death
rates. Yet the responses are modest, and Figure 2 shows no discernible response of social
distancing intentions to the roughly 75 percent drop in COVID deaths since early 2022. This timeseries evidence provides little reason to anticipate an end to the pandemic will bring a rapid end to
social distancing behaviors. The cross-sectional survey evidence in Schneider et al. (2021)
discussed in Section 2 supports the same conclusion.

22

Figure 9 plots the estimated impact of Long Social Distancing on the participation rate by
month throughout the period covered by our data. In month 𝑡 we use data for the three-month
window covering 𝑡 − 2 to 𝑡 to implement the regression-based approach. The estimated drag on
participation drifts upward from fall 2020 to spring 2022, more than doubling over this period,
before falling over the last few months of our sample. The estimated effects in recent months
remain greater than in any period from July 2020 through the end of 2021. Clearly, there is no
simple relationship between the effects of Long Social Distancing and the current or recent severity
of the pandemic. These patterns give little reason to think that Long Social Distancing and its
effects will naturally and gradually wind down if, and when, the pandemic recedes more fully.
Instead, this evidence suggests that Long Social Distancing and its effects will persist for
many months or years. That assessment also aligns with other evidence that searing personal
experiences have persistent effects on perceptions and risk-taking behavior. As Malmendier and
Wachter (2022) put it in their summary of research in this area, “More recent experiences have a
stronger impact on individual expectations and risk-taking than experiences made earlier in life,
though big enough shocks have a detectable impact on individuals decades later.”
Another explanation for the persistence of Long Social Distancing and its effects is that the
negative experiences and perceptions associated with COVID-19 have continued to accumulate:
more and more people have contracted the virus over time, many have contracted it more than
once (dispelling any hope that recovery confers immunity from future infections), vaccines have
proven tremendously useful but no guarantee against infection, herd immunity is now understood
as an elusive or unattainable goal, and evidence has mounted that Long COVID is a major concern.
In all these respects, people with a cautious bent or with underlying health conditions that place
them at higher risk of death or serious illness from COVID-19 can find sound, understandable
reasons to continue and even intensify their social distancing practices. People who live with or
care for immuno-compromised persons also have sound reasons to continue social distancing.
There are some countervailing forces. First, the pandemic drew attention to indoor air
quality and its role in raising or lowering infection risks at the workplace. Better ventilation and
other steps to improve air quality could draw some people back into the labor force. However,
improving indoor air quality is costly and can require a complex set of changes, especially in
existing buildings and worksites (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2022). So, gains on this
front are likely to be incremental, unfolding over many years.

23

Second, the pandemic catalyzed a large, lasting increase in working from home (Barrero
et al., 2021b, and Aksoy et al., 2022). That made it much easier to socially distance while
remaining employed. But work-from-home opportunities remain scarce for non-college workers.
And as we saw in Figure 3 and Table 6, social distancing intentions and their labor force drag
effects are much stronger for non-college workers. It may well be that work-from-home
opportunities substantially mitigate the negative participation effects of infection worries for
highly educated persons, but that those effects have already played out. 16 Our results are consistent
with this view. In any event, the scope for drawing non-college workers into the labor force via
jobs that let them work from home most or all of the time appears to be rather modest.
Third, household savings soared during the period covered by our empirical analysis
through a combination of reduced consumer spending in the early stages of the pandemic, massive
transfer payments to households as part of expanded income support programs, and extraordinary
forbearance in loan repayment obligations (often mandated by government policies).17 As a result,
households enjoyed unusually strong liquid asset positions during the period covered by our
empirical analysis. The strength of their balance sheets meant that many households could exit the
labor force, at least temporarily, while maintaining a desired standard of living. That may have
facilitated decisions to withdraw from the labor force in reaction to infection worries. By 2022,
the extraordinary factors that had curtailed household spending and boosted non-labor income in
2020 and 2021 had largely disappeared. Thus, many households will spend down their liquid assets
and face stronger financial pressures to seek work in the coming months or years. Whether, and
how much, that will weaken the link between infection worries and labor force participation
remains to be seen. We know of no research that speaks directly to that issue.
Finally, if labor force participation remains depressed because of infection concerns,
particularly among the less-educated, it will encourage substitution responses on the demand side
of the labor market (e.g., more automation, more scope for remote work) and on the supply side
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According to a survey conducted by the Pew Research Center in January 2022, 42 percent of
Americans who work from home most or all of the time do so because of concerns about work-related
exposure to the coronavirus (Parker, Horowitz and Minkin, 2022).
17
See Cherry (2021) and Higgins and Klitgaard (2021) on these developments. According to the U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis, the personal savings rate averaged 7.4 percent from 2015 to 2019, as
compared to 16.3 percent in 2020, 12.1 percent in 2021 and 5.4 percent in the first half of 2022. See the
PSAVERT series on FRED, accessed on 3 September 2022.
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(e.g., less education, selective sorting into remote work) that moderates the longer-term output and
relative wage effects of social distancing.
On balance, these various pieces of evidence and observations lead us to conclude that
Long Social Distancing and its effects will persist for many months and perhaps for several years.
The direct evidence in Figure 2 and Figure 9 supports this conclusion.. The countervailing forces
we identified are likely to act with modest force in the near term, with the possible exception of
how household balance sheets influence the extent of Long Social Distancing and its effects on
labor force participation. We see that as an open question.
7. Concluding Remarks
More than ten percent of Americans with recent work experience say they will continue
social distancing after the COVID-19 pandemic ends. Another 45 percent will do so in limited
ways. We uncover this Long Social Distancing phenomenon in our monthly Survey of Working
Arrangements and Attitudes. The phenomenon is more common among older persons, women, the
less educated, those who earn less, and in occupations and industries that require many face-toface encounters. We estimate that Long Social Distancing reduced the labor force participation
rate by 2.0 to 2.5 percentage points in the first half of 2022, or 1.4 points on an earnings-weighted
basis. We find large effects on the participation of non-college workers, moderate effects on those
with some college, and small effects on the participation of the college-educated. When combined
with simple equilibrium models, our estimated participation effects imply that Long Social
Distancing reduced output by nearly one percent and shrank the college wage premium by 1.0 to
2.6 percentage points. The weight of the available evidence suggests that Long Social Distancing
and its effects will persist for many months and perhaps years.
In closing, we highlight two directions for future research. First, to what extent do the
labor force participation effects of Long COVID overlap with those of Long Social Distancing?
Long COVID is a health condition that impairs work capacity, which directly impedes labor
force participation. Long COVID can also affect participation indirectly through its impact on
risk perceptions, infection worries, and social distancing intentions. Insofar as Long Social
Distancing deters participation because people suffer from Long COVID – or worry about it –
medical advances that cure, effectively treat or prevent the condition will erase the deterrent
effect on labor force participation. Insofar as Long Social Distancing and its effects arise from a
generalized fear of infection risks brought on by personal and societal experience of the
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pandemic, they will not. So, resolving this question is interesting as a means of gaining insight
into how experience affects economic behaviors and as a means of gauging the impact of
COVID-related medical advances on future labor force participation.
Second, our study illustrates how surveys can be used to elicit self-assessed causal effects
at the individual level, and how the resulting individual-level data can be combined with
equilibrium models to quantify aggregate implications. We hope our study inspires more
research in a similar vein. The idea of asking people about the reasons for their economic
behaviors is not a new one. Indeed, Freeman (1989) remarks that John Dunlop, his
undergraduate professor and doctoral advisor at Harvard in the 1960s, encouraged researchers to
speak with labor and management to obtain insights about the operation of markets. Freeman
continues, “Getting the opinions of the subjects of our research is about the only advantage we
have over physicists. Quarks and gluons do not talk about what they do or why, not even to
Richard Feynman.” That line resonates with us, and we think economists have under invested in
the use of surveys and structured interviews to elicit self-assessed causal effects. There are
exceptions, to be sure. Bewley’s book (1999) on the sources of downward wage rigidity is a
prominent example, but one that stands out for its unusual methods as well as its insights. Of
course, the use of surveys to elicit self-assessed causal effects is subject to many challenges,
pitfalls, and limitations. That’s true of every method economists have at their disposal to assess
causal effects.
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Figure 1. Long Social Distancing: 13% of respondents plan no
return to pre-COVID activities after the pandemic ends, and another
46% plan less than a complete return.
As the COVID-19 pandemic ends, which of
the following would best fit your views on social distancing?
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Notes: The title of the chart shows
the latest version of the survey
question underlying the data. The
sample includes respondents from
the February 2022 to July 2022
SWAA waves. The SWAA samples
US residents aged 20 to 64 who
earned $10,000 or more in 2019 or
2021. (In February we randomized
across the two years and asked
about 2021 starting with the March
survey.)
N = 27,632.
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Figure 2. Social Distancing Intentions by Month, July 2020 to July 2022
As the COVID-19 pandemic ends, which of
the following would best fit your views on social distancing?
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Notes: The title of the chart shows
the latest version of the survey
question underlying the data. In
2020
we
initally
asked
respondents about the possibilities
of vaccine discovery, then vaccine
approval and wide availability, and
then in 2021 to a scenario when
most of the population would be
vaccinated. The sample includes
respondents from the July 2020 to
July 2022 waves of the SWAA.
The SWAA samples US residents
aged 20 to 64 who earned $10,000
or more in 2019 or 2021. (Starting
in January 2022, we transitioned to
a prior-year earnings requirement).
N = 94,355.
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Figure 3. Strong-form Long Social Distancing Falls with Education
and Earnings
Figure 3.A.
Strong-form Long Social Distancing by education
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Notes: The sample includes
respondents from the February to
July 2022 survey waves. The
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Figure 3.B.
Strong-form Long Social Distancing by earnings
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$10,000 or more using 2019 or
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Figure A.5 for a more granular set
of earnings bins.
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Figure 4. Strong-Form Long Social Distancing Rises with Age
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Figure 5. Strong-Form Long Social Distancing Is Higher for Women in
All Age Groups
Strong-form Long Social Distancing by age and sex
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Figure 6. Strong-Form Long Social Distancing by Partisan Affiliation
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Figure 7. 22% of Sampled Persons Who are Neither Working
Nor Seeking Work Cite Infection Concerns as a Reason
Are worries about catching COVID or other infectious
diseases a factor in your decision not to seek work?
Yes, the main reason

9.3

Yes a secondary reason

12.5

No

78.1

Notes:
The
sample
includes
respondents to the February and July
2022 SWAA who passed the attention
check questions and indicated their
working status in the week prior to the
survey was “Not working, and not
looking for work”. The SWAA samples
US residents aged 20 to 64 who
earned $10,000 or more in 2019. In
February and July 2022, 10.9% of all
respondents were not working and not
seeking work.
N = 3,081.
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Figure 8. The Regression and Self-Assessment Methods Yield
Similar Labor Force Drag Effects at the Group Level
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40

Figure 9. The Long Social Distancing drag on labor force participation
by month from July 2020 to July 2022
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Notes: In month t we pool data for t-2 to t and
regress an indicator for whether a respondent
is out of the labor force (not working and not
looking for work) on their responses to the
question “After the COVID-19 pandemic has
ended, which of the following would best fit
your views on social distancing?” with “Full
return to pre-COVID activities” as the baseline
level, and controls for survey wave, education
and age categories. We multiply the coefficients
for each type of (incomplete) return to preCOVID activities by the corresponding share of
respondents and add the results to obtain the
total effect of social distancing on labor force
non-participation. Data are from the July 2020
to July 2022 waves of the SWAA.
N = 94,355 (regression-based approach).
N = 27,632 (self-assessment approach)
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Table 1. Comparison of SWAA and HPS Responses to the HPS
Question about the Main Reason for Not Working
What is your main reason for not working for pay or profit?

Household Pulse Survey

Sample Period

July 27 - August 8, 2022
Percent of respondents

I was concerned about getting or spreading the coronavirus
I am/was sick with coronavirus symptoms or caring for someone who was
sick with coronavirus symptoms

Survey of Working
Arrangements and Attitudes
August 11 - August 19, 2022
Respondents who
All respondents
pass attention check
questions
Percent

1.5
(0.2)

2.1
(0.7)

2.3
(0.8)

2.4

1.3

1.4

(0.3)

(0.5)

(0.6)

Observations
3534
477
391
Notes: This table shows responses to the question shown on the top left in the Household Pulse Survey (HPS) and the Survey of Working Arrangements and
Attitudes (SWAA) for the sample periods shown. The response options are 1) I did not want to be employed at this time; 2) I am/was sick with coronavirus
symptoms or caring for someone who was sick with coronavirus symptoms; 3) I am/was caring for children not in school or daycare; 4) I am/was caring for an
elderly person; 5) I was concerned about getting or spreading the coronavirus; 6) I am/was sick (not coronavirus related) or disabled; 7) I am retired; 8) I am/was laid
off or furloughed due to coronavirus pandemic; 9) My employer closed temporarily due to the coronavirus pandemic; 10) My employer went out of business due to
the coronavirus pandemic; 11) I do/did not have transportation to work; 12) Other reason, please specify. In the SWAA, we combine options 9 and 10 into a single
option saying "My employer went out of business due to the coronavirus pandemic" and we reclassify responses of "Other reason" depending on the description
provided. The sample for the SWAA restricts attention to people who report not working and not seeking work. For the HPS we drop persons with household income
per adult below $25,000 (for 1-person households) or $17,500 (for 2- or 3-adult households) to attempt to match the SWAA's $10,000 2021 earnings requirement,
and we drop persons who applied for or received unemployment insurance benefits since 2022 and those who report job loss in the household during the four weeks
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before the survey.

Table 2. Infection Worries and Labor Force Participation: It’s Not Just
about COVID-Related Concerns
Source of data: Survey of Working Arrangement and Attitudes, Wave Fielded from August 11-19
What is your main reason for not working for pay or profit?
Percent of respondents
I was concerned about getting or spreading the
coronavirus

Other responses

2.3
(0.8)
97.7
(0.8)

Are worries about catching COVID or other infectious
diseases a factor in your decision not to seek work at this
time? (SWAA)
Percent of respondents

Yes, the main reason
Other responses indicating not the main
reason

8.3
(1.4)
91.7
(1.4)

Observations
391
391
Notes: This table shows responses to the two questions shown at the top in the August 2022 wave of the Survey of Working Arrangements and Attitudes
(SWAA). For the question on the top left, the full set of response choices is 1) I did not want to be employed at this time; 2)I am/was sick with coronavirus
symptoms or caring for someone who was sick with coronavirus symptoms; 3) I am/was caring for children not in school or daycare; 4) I am/was caring for an
elderly person; 5) I was concerned about getting or spreading the coronavirus; 6) I am/was sick (not coronavirus related) or disabled; 7) I am retired; 8) I
am/was laid off or furloughed due to coronavirus pandemic; 9) My employer went out of business due to the coronavirus pandemic; 10) I do/did not have
transportation to work; 11) Other reason, please specify. We reclassify responses of "Other reason" depending on the description provided. For the question on
the top right, the full set of response options is 1) Yes, the main reason; 2) Yes, a secondary reason; 3) No. The sample restricts attention to people who report
not working and not seeking work and who passed the attention check questions.
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Table 3. Based on self assessments, infection worries depressed LF
participation by 2.0 percentage points as of February-July 2022
(1)

Question: Are worries about catching COVID or other infectious
diseases a factor in your decision not to seek work at this time?

Percent of Those
Currently Out of
the Labor Force

(2)

(3)

Percent of labor force
Implied Drag on
Percent of full non-participation
LF Participation
sample
determined by fear of
Rate (ppts)
infection

Yes, the main reason

9.3

1.2

100

Yes, a secondary reason

12.5

1.6

50

No

78.1

10.2

0

-

86.9

-

Does not apply: currently working or unemployed (furloughed or seeking work)

(4)

Total drag =

1.2
(0.07)
0.8
(0.04)
0.0
(-)
2.0
(0.08)

Observations
2,739
27,632
Notes: Column 1 shows the distribution of responses to the question shown at the top left among respondents who are out of the labor force (not working and not
seeking work). Column 2 shows the distribution among the full sample, including respondents who didn't see the question because they are in the labor force
(employed or unemployed). Column 3 assigns numerical values representing how much of a respondent's decision not to participate in the labor force comes from
worries about catching COVID or other infectious diseases, as a function of their response to the survey question at the top left. Column 4 computes the implied
drag of infection fears on labor force participation by multiplying the coefficient from the second column with the percent/100 from the third column. Data are
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from the February to July 2022 SWAA waves.

Table 4. Our regression approach to quantifying the impact of LongSocial Distancing on labor force participation
Question: Once the COVID-19 pandemic has ended, which of the following would best fit your views on social
distancing?
Dependent variable: 100 x 1(Not working and not looking for work)

Complete return to pre-COVID activities (baseline)
Substantial return to pre-COVID activities (e.g. avoid subway, crowded elevators)
Partial return to pre-COVID activities (e.g. avoid eating out, taxi/ride-share)
No return to pre-COVID activities

Regression
Coefficient
(St. Error)

Percent of
sample

0.4
(0.6)
4.1***
(0.9)
15.3***
(1.1)

42.0
31.0
14.5
12.5

Total drag =

Implied Drag on
LF Participation
Rate (ppts)
0.1
(0.2)
0.6
(0.1)
1.9
(0.1)
2.6
(0.3)

Observations
27,632
R-squared
0.02
Notes: We report robust standard errors in parentheses with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The second column shows the percent of respondents
that chose each response to the social distancing question in the first column. The final column computes the implied drag of continued social
distancing on labor force -participation by multiplying the coefficient from the first column with the percent/100 from the second column. We

compute standard errors using the joint variance-covariance matrix of regression coefficients and sample shares via the Delta method.
Data are from the February to July 2022 SWAA waves.
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Table 5. Stronger social distancing intentions yield lower participation rates
(1)

Complete return to pre-COVID activities (baseline)
Substantial return to pre-COVID activities (e.g. avoid subway, crowded elevators)
Partial return to pre-COVID activities (e.g. avoid eating out, taxi/ride-share)
No return to pre-COVID activities

-

-

-

-

-

0.4
(0.6)
4.1***
(0.9)
15.3***
(1.1)

0.3
(0.6)
3.8***
(0.9)
15.3***
(1.1)

1.2**
(0.6)
4.4***
(0.8)
13.6***
(1.1)

0.9
(0.6)
3.8***
(0.8)
13.0***
(1.1)

1.5***
(0.6)
3.7***
(0.8)
11.7***
(1.0)

Y

Y
Y

Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y

2.6
(0.3)

2.7
(0.3)

2.4
(0.3)

2.5
(0.3)

FE for:
Survey wave
Age category (e.g. 20 to 29, 30 to 39, …)
Sex
Educational attainment
Effect of incomplete return on non-participation

(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
100 x 1(Not working and not looking for work)

2.6
(0.3)

Observations
27,632
27,632
27,632
27,632
27,632
R-squared
0.02
0.03
0.10
0.10
0.12
Notes: Columns 1 to 6 run regressions with 100 x (Not working and not looking for work) as the dependent variable against responses to the question "Once the COVID-19
pandemic has ended, which of the following would best fit your views on social distancing?" and various fixed effects. We report robust standard errors in parentheses in
columns 1 to 7 with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The row for "Effect of incomplete return on non participation" reports the dot product of the vector of coefficients for
social distancing and the vector with the share of respondents corresponding to each coefficient. We compute standard errors using the joint variance-covariance matrix of
regression coefficients and sample shares via the Delta method. Data are from the February to July 2022 SWAA waves.
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Table 6. Long Social Distancing Exerts a Much Larger Drag on the
Labor Force Participation of Those with Less Education
(1)
Dependent Variable
Sample
Complete return to pre-COVID activities (baseline)
Substantial return to pre-COVID activities (e.g. avoid subway, crowded elevators)
Partial return to pre-COVID activities (e.g. avoid eating out, taxi/ride-share)
No return to pre-COVID activities

FE for: survey wave, age category (e.g. 20 to 29), sex, and education categories
Effect of incomplete return on non-participation

(2)

(3)

(4)

100 x 1(Not working and not looking for work)
Did Not Attend
College

1 to 3 years of
college

4-year college
degree

Graduate degree

-

-

-

-

3.4**
(1.4)
7.7***
(1.8)
16.5***
(1.9)

2.0*
(1.1)
2.3*
(1.3)
11.1***
(1.7)

-0.6
(0.9)
0.9
(1.3)
7.2***
(1.9)

0.4
(1.2)
3.7*
(1.9)
3.7
(2.7)

Y

Y

Y

Y

4.8
(0.7)

2.4
(0.5)

0.6
(0.5)

0.9
(0.6)

Observations
6,655
6,921
7,452
6,604
R-squared
0.14
0.09
0.10
0.08
Notes: We regress 100 x 1(Not working and not looking for work) as the dependent variable against responses to the question "Once the COVID-19 pandemic has ended,
which of the following would best fit your views on social distancing?" and various fixed effects. Columns 1 to 4 split the sample by education groups. In column 1, we allow
for separate constant terms for respondents who didn't finish high school, and those with a high school degree. We report robust standard errors in parentheses with *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The row for "Effect of incomplete return on non participation" reports the dot product of the vector of coefficients for social distancing and the vector with
the share of respondents corresponding to each coefficient. We compute standard errors using the joint variance-covariance matrix of regression coefficients and sample shares 47
via the Delta method. Data are from the February to July 2022 SWAA waves.
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Table A.1 Joint distribution of Long Social Distancing and selfassessment of whether infection fears are a reason not to seek work
(1)

Are worries about catching COVID
or other infectious diseases a factor in
your decision not to seek work?
Yes, the main reason
Yes, a secondary reason
No

(2)
(3)
Type of return to pre-COVID activities

(4)

Complete

Substantial

Partial

None (i.e., Strong
Form of Social
Distancing)

1.5
(0.2)
1.9
(0.3)
30.1
(0.9)

2.2
(0.3)
4.3
(0.4)
19.2
(0.8)

2.4
(0.3)
3.4
(0.3)
10.4
(0.6)

3.2
(0.3)
3.0
(0.3)
18.5
(0.7)

Observations
2,739
Notes: This table shows the joint distribution of responses to the following questions in the February to July 2022
waves of the SWAA: Have worries about catching COVID or other infectious diseases a factor in your decision not to
seek work at this time? Once the COVID-19 pandemic has ended, which of the following would best fit your views on
social distancing? The sample includes respondents who are currently not working and not seeking work. Each cell
shows the percent of respondents who chose responses given by the respective row and column of the matrix. Standard
errors in parentheses.
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Table A.2. Infection worries depress participation by 1.3 to 2.3
percentage points, depending on how we quantify the effects
(1)
Question: Are worries about catching COVID or other infectious
diseases a factor in your decision not to seek work at this
time?

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Percent of labor force non-participation determined by fear of
infection (alternative assignment values)

(6)
Percent of
full sample

Yes, the main reason

100

100

100

100

90

1.2

Yes, a secondary reason

50

67

33

25

10

1.6

No

0

0

0

0

0

10.2

Does not apply: currently working or unemployed (furloughed or seeking work)

-

-

-

-

-

86.9

2.0
(0.1)

2.3
(0.1)

1.8
(0.1)

1.6
(0.1)

1.3
(0.1)

Effect of infection fears on non-participation

27,632
Observations
Notes: Columns 1 to 5 assign numerical values representing how much of a respondent's decision not to participate in the labor force comes from worries about catching
COVID or other infectious diseases, as a function of their response to the survey question transcribed at the top left of the table. Column 6 shows the percent of the sample
choosing each response or the percent who didn't see the question because it does not apply to them. The row computes the effect of infection fears on labor force nonparticipation as the "dot product” of the vector of values in each column with the vector containing the percent/100 in each category shown in column 6. Data are from the
Feburary to July 2022 SWAA waves.
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Table A.3 Comparing the Self-Assessment and Regression
Approaches by Group (Equal-Weighted Estimates)
Drag on Labor Force
Participation Rate

Self-assessment

Group-level
Group-level
regressions, no regressions,
Estimate (SE)
controls*
with controls

Overall

2.0

(0.1)

2.6

2.5

Women
Men

2.8
1.3

(0.1)
(0.1)

3.0
1.9

2.8
2.2

Age 20 to 29
Age 30 to 39
Age 40 to 49
Age 50 to 64

1.1
1.1
2.2
3.2

(0.1)
(0.1)
(0.2)
(0.2)

0.4
1.3
2.1
5.5

0.3
1.0
1.7
5.3

No college
1 to 3 years of college
4-year college degree
Graduate degree

2.9
2.2
1.4
1.0

(0.2)
(0.2)
(0.1)
(0.1)

5.1
2.6
0.5
1.1

4.8
2.4
0.6
0.9

Drag on Labor Force
Participation Rate

Self-assessment

Group-level
Group-level
regressions, no regressions,
controls*
with controls

Estimate

(SE)

Ann. Earnings of $10 to $20K
Ann. Earnings of $20 to $50K
Ann. Earnings of $50 to $100K
Ann. Earnings of $100 to $150K
Ann. Earnings over $150K

3.5
2.3
1.5
0.6
0.8

(0.5)
(0.1)
(0.1)
(0.1)
(0.1)

5.7
2.9
1.1
0.5
0.0

5.1
2.7
1.3
0.2
0.1

Goods-producing sectors
Service sectors

1.3
1.8

(0.2)
(0.1)

0.4
2.3

0.9
2.1

No children
Living with children under 18

2.1
2.0

(0.1)
(0.1)

2.9
2.0

3.0
1.7

Democrats (consolidated)
Republicans (consolidated)
Independents & Other Parties

2.4
1.8
1.8

(0.1)
(0.1)
(0.2)

5.3
2.1
2.0

3.6
2.1
2.0

Notes: We compute the drag implied by Long Social Distancing on labor force participation rates for each group defined in the table and a series of methodological variations. The "Self-assessment"
estimates use responses to the question "Are worries about catching COVID or other infectious diseases a factor in your decision not to seek work at this time?" and assigns values to the responses as in
Table 3. The other columns use regressions with 100 x 1(Not working and not seeking work) as the dependent variable and preferences for Long Social Distancing as explanatory variables, computing
counterfactuals using the method from Table 4. The second column estimates a separate regression for each group, with no demographic or other controls except for the "No college" group we allow the
intercept do differ between those who completed High School from those who didn't. The third column estimates a separate regression for each group, including fixed effects for survey wave, age, sex,
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and education categories as in Table 5 (but fixed effects for the dimension that defines a group drop out of such regressions).

Table A.4 Comparing the Self-Assessment and Regression Approaches
by Group (Earnings-Weighted Estimates)
Drag on Labor Force
Participation Rate

Self-assessment

Group-level
Group-level
regressions, no regressions,
Estimate (SE)
controls*
with controls

Overall

1.4

(0.1)

1.6

1.5

Women
Men

2.1
0.9

(0.1)
(0.1)

2.1
1.0

1.9
1.2

Age 20 to 29
Age 30 to 39
Age 40 to 49
Age 50 to 64

0.8
0.8
1.2
2.2

(0.1)
(0.1)
(0.1)
(0.2)

0.7
0.8
0.8
3.5

0.6
0.6
0.7
3.1

No college
1 to 3 years of college
4-year college degree
Graduate degree

2.5
1.8
1.1
0.5

(0.2)
(0.1)
(0.1)
(0.1)

4.2
1.7
0.4
1.0

4.2
1.2
0.3
0.9

Drag on Labor Force Participation Rate

Self-assessment Group-level Group-level
regressions, no regressions,
Estimate (SE)
controls* with controls

Ann. Earnings of $10 to $20K
Ann. Earnings of $20 to $50K
Ann. Earnings of $50 to $100K
Ann. Earnings of $100 to $150K
Ann. Earnings over $150K

3.5
2.2
1.4
0.6
0.5

(0.5)
(0.1)
(0.1)
(0.1)
(0.1)

5.7
2.7
1.0
0.5
0.5

5.1
2.5
1.2
0.2
0.5

Goods-producing sectors
Service sectors

0.8
1.3

(0.1)
(0.1)

-0.2
1.8

0.2
1.5

No children
Living with children under 18

1.6
1.1

(0.1)
(0.1)

1.8
1.1

1.9
1.0

Democrats (consolidated)
Republicans (consolidated)
Independents & Other Parties

1.6
1.1
1.4

(0.1)
(0.1)
(0.1)

3.6
1.0
1.0

2.3
1.2
1.2

Notes: We compute the (earnings-weighted) drag implied by Long Social Distancing on labor force participation rates for each group defined in the table and a series of methodological variations.
The "Self-assessment" estimates use responses to the question "Are worries about catching COVID or other infectious diseases a factor in your decision not to seek work at this time?" and assigns
values to the responses as in Table 3. The other columns use regressions with 100 x 1(Not working and not seeking work) as the dependent variable and preferences for Long Social Distancing as
explanatory variables, computing counterfactuals using the method from Table 4. The second column estimates a separate regression for each group, with no demographic or other controls except
for the "No college" group we allow the intercept do differ between those who completed High School from those who didn't. The third column estimates a separate regression for each group,
including fixed effects for survey wave, age, sex, and education categories as in Table 5 (but fixed effects for the dimension that defines a group drop out of such regressions).
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Figure A.1 Attention Check Question #1 (asked from November 2021)

53

Figure A.2 Attention Check Question #2 (asked from December 2021)
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Figure A.3 Attention Check Question #3 (asked from March 2022)

55

Figure A.4. SWAA Question on Social Distancing Intentions,
Version Asked from October 2021 to May 2022

Note: In June 2022, we randomized over this question and the version stated at the outset of Section 3 in the main text,
with 50 percent of the sample receiving each version.
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Figure A.5. Strong-Form Long Social Distancing Falls with Earnings
Strong-Form Long Social Distancing by Earnings
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Notes: The sample includes
respondents from the October
2021 to March 2022 survey
waves. The SWAA samples US
residents aged 20 to 64 who
earned $10,000 or more using
2019 or 2021 earnings. We don’t
use weights when computing the
mean for each earnings bucket in
this figure.
N = 27,633.
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Figure A.6 Strong-form Long Social Distancing is Lowest Among
Workers in Education and Highest in Transportation and Warehousing
Strong-form Long Social Distancing by industry
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Notes: The sample includes
respondents from the February to
July 2022 survey waves. The
SWAA samples US residents
aged 20 to 64 who earned
$10,000 or more using 2019 or
2021 earnings.
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Figure A.7. Strong-form Long Social Distancing is Highest Among
Workers in Other Personal Services Occupations and Lowest Among
those in Management, Business, and Financial occupations
Strong-form Long Social Distancing by occupation
Other Personal Services
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Notes: The sample includes
respondents from the February to
July 2022 survey waves. The
SWAA samples US residents
aged 20 to 64 who earned
$10,000 or more using 2019 or
2021 earnings.
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Figure A.8. Desired Work-from-Home Days Rise with the Strength of
Social Distancing Intentions.
Type of return to pre-COVID activities

Preferences for working from home after the pandemic
Complete return

2.8

Substantial return

2.7

Partial return

3.0

No return

3.3

0

.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

Days per week
Sample: Respondents who are working or looking for work, and able to
work from home.

3.5

Notes: The sample includes
respondents who are employed or
unemployed (seeking work or
awaiting recall to an old job) and
who are able to work from home
(as revealed by having done so
during the pandemic) in the
January to March 2022 waves of
the SWAA. Preferences for working
from home after the pandemic
come from responses to the
question, “As the pandemic ends,
how often would you like to have
paid workdays at home?”
N = 17,993.
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Figure A.9. U.S. Deaths and Hospitalizations Due to COVID-19,
Seven-Day Moving Averages, 22 January 2020 to 30 August 2022

Source: Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center at https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/region/united-states, accessed on 2 September 2022.
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